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Abstract
A simple model of adaptive control of promotional spending
is analyzed. In the model, company sales (and therefore profits)
are functions of promotional spending rate. Sales response to
the promotion changes with time as a result of changes in a para-
meter of the sales response function. Information about sales
response is collected in each time period by performing an ex-
periment. On the basis of present and past information, the pro-
motion rate is set to maximize expected profit in the next period.
The experiment is chosen to minimize the combined costs of im-
perfect information and experimentation.
A numerical example is studied analytically and by simulation
the adaptive system appears to work well. In a sensitivity
analysis, the system based on one underlying model of the market
is found to perform well when the underlying model is changed
considerably.

A Model of Adaptive Control of Promotional Spending
*
John D. C. Little
1 . Introduction
A company must assemble marketing information, use it to modify
its conception of the market, use the revised conception to make mar-
keting decisions, and then arrange for the collection of new informa-
tion. In short, a company needs a control system for its marketing
variables
.
Obviously every company has some procedure for determining its
marketing actions, but usually the relationships between data inputs
and decision outputs are not at all formally specified. Our interest
is in studying possible inputs and possible relationships to deter-
mine their effect on overall company performance. Presumably, by
careful systems design, companies can achieve better marketing per-
formance than they do now.
Formal systems design in the sense we mean will require con-
siderable development. Marketing variables are many and so are the
possible sources and forms of information. However, we can at least
start the job by investigating a simple marketing system that in-
volves some of the important ideas.
The system consists of a model of the marketing process to be
controlled, a means of using the model to set values for the marketing
Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02139.
Work reported was supported in part by Project MAC, an MIT research
program sponsored by the Advanced Research Project Agency, Depart-
ment of Defense, under the Office of Naval Research Contract No.
Nonr-4102(01) . Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any
purpose of the United States Government.

-2
variables, and a measurement device for keeping the model up to date.
The model of the process is briefly as follows: company sales (and
therefore profits) are functions of a single variable, a rate of
spending money on promotion. The sales response to promotion
changes with time. The change is the result of a single changing
parameter in the sales response function.
The control cycle operates as shown in Figure 1: Based on the
sales model, a calculation is made that sets the promotion rate to
maximize expected profit in the next time period. An experiment is
then designed to monitor the effectiveness of the promotion. The
results are then implemented, the market responds, and some sales
rate is produced. The sales data thereby generated represents new
information, which is then combined with old information to update
the sales model. The cycle is then repeated.
In designing the control system, we must specify how to combine
new and old information and we must determine what size of experiment
to perform. We plan to combine new and old information so as to
maximize the expected profit from the decisions that use the informa-
tion. The size of the experiment will be chosen to minimize the sum
of the losses arising from imperfect information about sales response
and from the cost of performing the experiment.
Thus, the problem is set up according to the principles of
statistical decision theory. The problem has a complication not
found in elementary applications, however, because sales response is
changing with time, and, as a result, the value of a piece of inform
mation deteriorates with its age.
For a measuring instrument, we shall work with direct sales
experiments. That is, we shall take different groups of customers,
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Figure 1. Cycle of adaptive control of promotion.
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say, people in different geographical areas^ give them different
experimental treatments, and observe the effect on sales. Other,
less direct devices for monitoring sales response are of course
possible.
The overall system is certainly an idealization of real world
operations, but it is perhaps not too far from practicality. At
least one company we know goes around the feedback loop of Figure 1
in an informal way now.
2. Sales and Profit Models
The profit model expresses company profit rate in terms of its
sales rate, promotion rate, fixed cost rate, and incremental profit
on sales, the latter taken to be constant. To make the quantities as
concrete as possible we shall give them specific units. In particular^
money flows will be expressed in dollars per household per year
(dol./hh.yr.) . Let
s = sales rate, (dol./hh.yr.)
X = promotion rate. "
p = profit rate. "
c = fixed cost rate. "
ra = gross margin, the incremental profit as a fraction of
sales. (dimensionless)
The model of company profit is
(2.1) p = ms-x-c.
Notice that promotion enters here as a fixed cost. Thus we are not
planning to consider variable cost promotional activities (e.g.
price-off deals), although there is no conceptual difficulty in so
doing.

The sales model is set up as a simple quadratic in promotion
rate. We suppose that^ for a given fixed time period, sales response
has the general shape shown in Figure 2 and that the curve can be
approximated, at least near the current operating point, by a quadra-
tic function of x:
2
(2.2) s = a + px - Jfx .
The parameters a, P, and ^ are constants for the fixed time period
(they may be thought of as giving the average sales rate over the
period) but some of them may vary from period to period.
The value of x, say x
,
that maximizes profit is easily found
to be
(2.3) x = (mp - l)/2my.
If the company uses x instead of x
,
the loss rate, / , relative to
maximum profit is
.^(x) = p(x ) - p(x)
,
which, using (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3), becomes
(2.4) J^(x) = m^(x - X*) .
3. Changes in Sales Response
If the sales response parameters a, P, and ^ were known, we
*
n *
would set promotion rate to x and obtain the loss X (x ) =0.
However, the parameters are presumably fairly difficult to measure
and we ordinarily expect to come up with some non-optimal x and there-
fore to incur a relative loss.
If the parameters were constant over time, we would put a big
effort into measuring them right away, because the extra profit from
increased accuracy would extend far into the future. However, it is
difficult to believe that in practice the parameters stay constant.
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Figure 2. Shape of sales response to promotion in a fixed time
period.
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For example, competitive activity, product changes, changes in the
quality of the promotion, and shifts in economic conditions lead us
to expect shifts in response. Consequently, an expensive effort to
learn the parameters immediately cannot be justified. On the other
hand, the parameters may change fairly slowly with time, in which
case some effort is worthwhile. In each time period new information
is collected, combined with the old and used to set operations in the
immediate future.
To build a fairly simple model of changing sales response, we
shall suppose that a and p change with time in a specified way in-
volving some randomness, but that Y does not. As a matter of nota-
tion, we shall use the tilde (a^) when we wish to emphasize that some
quantity is being viewed as a random variable. Furthermore, a, P, s
and X usually depend on t, and when this needs emphasis we shall write
a(t), p(t), etc.
At a fixed time period, t, we assume that national sales rate
for the product is
(3.1) s = a + Px - !^x (dol./hh.yr.)
and that
Q:(t) has relatively high variance from time period to time
period
P(t) is dependent on p(t-l),
a and p are independent,
y is a known constant.
As implied by (2,3) and as will be seen, the current information
about a does not directly affect the optimal x. However, informa-
tion about a may make it possible to learn more about p in an experi-
ment. The assumption of high variance for a, (high conditional
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variance given the previous a's if successive a's are considered
dependent) may be fairly realistic and^ in any case^ simplifies the
statistical analysis by removing a as a contributor to information
about p.
The assumption that X is known and constant seems quite un-
realistic, but we shall argue later that this may not be too serious
to the successful operation of the system.
The response parameter p will be considered to be generated by
a random walk. One possibility is p(t) = p(t-l) + £p(t)^ where
C (t) = a random variable with mean = and variance = a
P P
We shall take
€
(t) to be normally distributed and independent of
previous values of p and €. • The difficulty with the above random
walk is that p is likely to wander unrealistically far from its
starting value. Therefore, we shall hypothesize a long run average
value and a tendency for p to return to that value. Specifically,
let
o ^^
P = the long run average value of p(t) .
k = a constant, < k < 1 .
We take as our model of changing p:
(3.2) 'p(t) = k p(t-l) + (l-k)p° + C„(t)
P
As k —^ 1
,
p(t) is increasingly dependent on p(t-l) and also wanders
o
more and more freely from p . As k—^ , p becomes independent from
time period to time period. Figure 3 shows a possible sequence of p(t)
versus t. To make p(t) more operationally meaningful, we observe that
if the promotion rate is held constant, the sales rate consists of a
constant plus a term directly proportional to p(t)
.
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Figure 3. Sketch of a possible variation of the sales response
parameter^ P^ with time period, t.
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4. An Experiment to Measure Current Sales Response
In the previous two sections we have described the environment in
which the company is operating. Next we describe the control system.
Our starting place in the cycle of Figure 1 will be the point of de-
signing an experiment to measure sales response.
Measuring sales response essentially means measuring p, since a
does not enter decisions and Jf is taken to be a known constant. Infor-
mation about p will be collected by operating different groups of
market areas at different promotion rates.
Although the national average sales rate is given by (3.1) we
suppose that individual markets differ in sales rate because of
local random variations. For some fixed t suppose that the national
parameters take on the specific values a = a and p = p. We assume
sales in a market are then given by ' .•
(4.1) 's = s(x) + £
where s = sales rate in the market, (dol
.
/hh.yr
.)
2
s(x) = a + px - jTx = national sales rate, (dol
.
/hh.yr.
)
€. = a random variable for the market, (dol
.
/hh.yr.)
We assume that £ is normally distributed, is independent from market
2
to market, and has mean - and variance = a .
The experiment is sketched in Figure 4. Suppose that at t we have
picked a promotion rate, x (t) . This will be used everywhere except
that in n markets we shall use a deliberately low value, x^ , and in
another n a deliberately high value, x- • We take
(4.2) x^ = x^(t) - ^/2
X. = x (t) + A/2
2 o
where ^ is a design constant yet to be selected.
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Figure 4. The sales experiment. A group of n markets is given a
promotion rate A,/2 greater than the national average^ x ,
and another group of n is given a rate A/2 less.
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Let s and s be the observed mean sales rates in the grovps of markets
x^ and X respectively. An estimate of p(t) can be computed from the
experimental data:
(4.3) 9(t) = (1/A)(S2+ ^^2^ " ^1 "
^""l^ ^
•
This will be called the "experimental mean". It is a random variable
_ _
*
because s, and s„ are random variables. Let
1 2
v = V [>(tO .
A^ A
From (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) we find that, given p(t) = P(t), p(t)
is normally distributed with mean and variance:
(4.4) E |j(t)2 = p(t)
2, 2
V = 2a /nA
Notice that v does not depend on t.
The experimental result (4.3) does not represent all our infor-
mation about p. Even before doing the experiment we had the informa-
tion developed in previous experiments. The information will be
summarized in a prior distribution for p(t). This distribution will
be taken to be normal with
pc/
-J
^
E' p(t)[ = mean of prior distribution of p(t),
v' = variance of prior distribution of p(t).
At the beginning of period t^ when the promotional rate, x(t), is
to be set, we have only the prior distribution. At the end of t, the
experimental results are at hand and we can construct a posterior
distribution. The additional information about P(t), however, is of
no use in t even though it will be helpful in t+1.
We use V P^ ^nd E |^ ^ ^° denote the variance and expectation
operators, respectively.
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5. Decision Rules for Updating the Model and Setting the Promotion
Rate
Returning to the control cycle, suppose that the experiment for
period t has been implemented, the market has responded, and we have
in hand the sales results. We are now ready to update the model and
go on to pick a promotion rate for period t+1
.
Decision rules for updating the model and setting promotion can
be determined by formal decision theory arguments, but we prefer to
defer these and begin intuitively. One reason is that the optimality
of formally derived rules is entirely dependent on the specific
assumptions of the model, some of which are rather restrictive. The
form of our decision rules, however, appears reasonable (although not
necessarily optimal) for a wide class of situations.
The decision rules are, first, to update the mean of our prior
distribution by an exponential smoothing process and, second, to set
promotion rate by a formula analogous to (2.3). Specifically, we
choose a number, a, such that ^ < ^ < 1 and update the mean by
(5.1) E' [j(t+l)j = a E" [tit)J + (1-a) p(t) .
Then we choose as our promotion rate for t+1:
(5.2) x^(t+l) = (mE'|j(t+l) - l)/2md' .
Suppose the process starts at t=l . It is necessary to pick a start-
ing value E" p(0) , but, thereafter, promotion rate is set mechan-
istically by the rule. Since we are dealing with an exponential
smoothing process, the effect of the starting value on later opera-
tions decays exponentially with t_.
Notice that the rule as stated makes no assumptions about the
underlying mechanisms generating a(t) and p(t) and, if we think
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of ^ as an arbitrary positive constant^ the rule is not tied down to
any specific sales response process. The rule can be applied to any
situation in which the experiment of Section 4 is performed, pro-
vided that somebody is willing to pick, a and ^ plus E' p(0) I and
the experimental design parameters A and n .
The behavior of the decision rules will be clearer if we ex-
press the resulting promotion rate somewhat differently. Let us
A ^
define a quantity, x (t), to be called the "experimental x " by
(5.3) ^^(t) = [m p^(t) - 1 /zmJT»• l:
This is the promotion rate that would be best if p actually equalled
the experimentally determined p. Using (5.3), (5,2) can be re-
written;
(5.4) X (t+1) = a X (t) + (1-a) ^ (t)
o o o
Thus the decision rules amount to using a weighted combination of
last period's promotion rate and the experimental x . If we have a
tight, accurate experiment, we should use a small a and so rely mostly
on the current experiment. If the accuracy of the experiment is low
,
a large a is appropriate. Then this year's promotion rate depends
mostly on last year's, which, in turn, represents a summary of con-
siderable past experience.
Still another way of writing the decision rule brings out more
sharply the role of the sales data. Using (4.3) and (5.3) we get
(5.5) ^o(t+l) = x^(t) + r(l-a)/Zm^Al U(s2-sp - zTj •
net profit for increasing the promotion rate from x to x
,
i.e. by
The quantity m(s„-s.,)
-A| is simply the experimentally estimated
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an amount A • If the net profit is positive^ x (t+1) is made larger
than X (t)j if it is negative^ x (t+1) is made smaller. The amount
of the adjustment is controlled by the constant (l-a)/2mS'A . If the
constant is large^ the promotion rate will be sensitive to the most
recent experiment^ if the constant is small^ insensitive.
Although an appropriate choice of constants is necessary for
reasonable operation^ the general form of our rule provides an
adaptive control system that might be expected to work fairly well
for a variety of underlying sales response mechanisms. One might
expect that^ if the constants were chosen with one mechanism in
mind^ they might work satisfactorily with other mechanisms not too
different. Whether or not this is so in a specific case can be
explored by simulation and sensitivity analysis.
For the sales response model being assumed we now wish to
motivate the decision rules more carefully and go on to pick optimal
values for £^ n^ and A .
6 . Choosing the Smoothing Constant
The smoothing constant^ a^ was used in (5.1) to combine new and
old information about p. We shall now show that a can be expressed
in terms of the experimental design constants and the constants of
the p(t) process.
Consider first the problem of finding the posterior distribution
of p(t) given its prior distribution and the experimental results at
t. Let
[p(t)]E'
I
I = mean of prior
P(t) = experimental mean
[i(t7| . mean of posterior
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v' = variance of prior
V = experimental variance
v" = variance of posterior
Since the prior of p(t) is normal and the distribution of p(t) given
p(t) is normal^ the posterior of p(t) is normal and has mean and
variance (see [ij p. 294-5):
(6.1) E" [ji(t)] = [v/(v+v')3 E' ['p'(t)] +[y'/(v+v')l ^(t)
(6.2) v" == v v'/(v+v')
The process generating p(t+l) has been specified in (3.2):
'p(t+l) = k p(t) + (l-k)p° +Cp(t+1) .
As of the beginning of t+1^ we know the posterior distribution for p(t) .
We also know the distribution of £ (t+1) , Since the two random variables
p
are independent^ the prior distribution of p(t+l) has mean and variance:
(6.3) E' [fCt+ljl = k E" [p(t)] + (l-k)p°
(6.4) V' [p(t+l)[ = k^ V" Q(t)\ + a 2
P
Furthermore, the prior of p at t+1 is normal and so the normality of
P is preserved as time passes.
Substituting (6.1) into (6.3), we obtain
(6.5) E- [^(t+ljj = k ^[^/(v+v'3 E- [p(t)J + [^'/(v+v')] ^(t)]
+ (1-k) p° .
If k is near one, a good approximation may be obtained by setting
k=l in the above expression. This has the advantage of eliminating k
o
and p as parameters in the decision rules and so we shall use it.
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However, there is no fundamental difficulty in carrying along k and
o
P , except that we must specify their values.
Under the k=l approximation, (6.5) is in the same form as (5.1)
and so we see that
(6.6) a = v/(v+v') .
Thus, for this case, we have justified the decision rule (i^.l) and
found a way to compute a. It remains to express v and v' in terms of
known parameters.
We already know v in terms of the experimental design parameters
by (4.4). With respect to v', we first observe that v' and v" will
not change with t once steady state operation is achieved. This is
2
because a and v do not change with t. In steady state, (6.4) and
(6.2) become
,
2 2
v' = k v" + Oo
p
v" = V v'7(v+v') ,
Using the k=l approximation and solving for v', we obtain
(6.7) V' =^apMl +
_1 + (4v/ap^)] ^> ,
2 T
where v = 2a /nA . Substitution of v and v' into (6,6) gives the
smoothing constant, a, in terms of a, n, A, and o . This completes
the job of finding a.
7 . Setting the Promotion Rate
Next we wish to justify the decision rule (5.2) for setting pro-
motion rate. Profit rate is a random variable because sales rate is:
(7.1) 'p(t) = m l'(t) - x(t) - c
(7.2) f(t) = -^(t) +y(t) x(t) -^x^t)
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We cannot maximize true profit but choose instead to maximize expected
profit. At the start of t^ the company's view of expected profit in
t is (simplifying the notation by suppressing t)
:
(7.3) E' Pp
I
= mJE'j
^J + E' [Tfx - jfx^j - x - c .
The company can maximize this by setting x(t) to be
(7.4) x^(t) = (mE'[_'p(t)^ - D/lmt .
This is (5.2)
.
At this point we have justified the decision rules of Section 5
for our specific model;, at least to the extent of k.=l approximation.
It remains to pick the parameters n and A of the experiment.
8. Designing the Experiment
The experimental design perameters will be picked to minimize the
sum of two losses: the loss incurred because. we do not know p exactly
and the loss incurred trying to learn p better. The losses will be
calculated relative to the profits obtainable under perfect information.
With perfect information we would choose the promotion rate;
(8.1) V(t) = [[m p(t) = l] /2m!r .
Instead we choose
(8.2) x^(t) = fm E- ['p'(t)1 -rj/Zmy .
Notice that
(8.3) E- p"(t)J = x^(t) .
The loss rate compared to perfect information is seen from (2,4) to be
lit) = mj^p^(t) - K-"(t)] .
Therefore^
E' |j(t)] =myV'p*(t)] = (m/4y)V'p(t)3
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or
(8.4) E'QeJ = (ra/4}r) V' ,
independent of t. This is the expected loss rate relative to perfect
information for those markets where we follow the decision rule to
use X (t)
.
o
In the 2n experimental markets, the expected loss rate is higher
because the promotion rate is deliberately set to be different from
the best available value, x (t) , Suppressing t for the moment, the
o
experimental promotion rates are
X, = X - 1/2A
1 o
x^ = X + 1/2A .
Z o
Consider a market at x^ . Let its loss rate relative to perfect
information be •'
-, 2
^1 = "'^Ei^'^t] = m^fQx^-'x*) -ACx^-'^*) + C-A^/4)J .
Therefore, using (8,3) and (8.4),
Letting J^ ~ \y ~ ^ ^^ ^^® extra cost rate of the experimental
deviation, we see that
ex
r 1 2(8.5) E' |_./? J = msA /4 . This same expression holds for a market
at x^.
The total expected loss rate can now be computed. The loss rates
above apply to individual markets and have the dimensions dol./hh.yr.
Let
N = total number of markets in the country,
2n = the number of experimental markets,
P = the average number of households in a market,
T = total expected loss rate (dol./yr.)
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We shall assume^ for simplicity^ that all markets have the same size^
but this is not essential. Then^
T = N P m v'/4^ +(l/2)PraJnA^ (dol/yr)
In later discussion of numerical results^ it will be convenient
to express loss rates in percentage terms. A problem is that most
quantities that are candidates for forming the denominators of such
percentages are fluctuating with time. However^ for several quanti-
ties we can construct reference values about which actual values
fluctuate. Let
o
P = long run average of p(t)
o
a = long run average of a(t)
(8.6) x° = (m p°~l)/2ra^
2
,^ -v o O o o , o,(8.7) s - a + p X - J('(x )' .
Here x is the optimal promotion rate if p = p ^ and s is the
o
corresponding rate when a = a . These quantities make convenient
reference points.
Now^ let
L = expected loss rate relative to perfect information (and
no experiment) as a fraction of the long run average
promotion rate, x
= |jN P m vV4^) + (l/2)Praj-nA J /N P x°
(8.8) L ^ m v'/4^ x° + m JJ nA /2 N x°
The experimental design parameters n and A. will be picked to mini-
mize L. First, we observe from (8,8) and (4.4) that n and A always
2 2
appear in L in the combination nA . We shall therefore find nA to
minimize L. Then we can more or less trade off n against any way
we wish as long as OA is kept to its minimizing value. Practically,
there are limitations (e.g. x must be non-negative and 2n not greater
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than N^ to cite two extremes) but the flexibility implied is inter-
esting and valuable.
2
Rather than minimize L with respect to nA directly, we mini-
2 2 2
mize with respect to the dimensionless quantity z = 8a /a_ nA
,
2
from which nA can be immediately calculated, by means of
2 2 2
(8.9) nA = 8ct /ct„ z .
p
Substituting this into (4.4) to get v, v into (6.7) to get v', and
2
then v' and nA into (8.8), we obtain L in terms of z:
(8.10) L = (ma^/8 J-x°) 1 + (l+z)2 + 8m^ a /Na x°z
Setting dL/dz = 0, we obtain an equation that optimal z must satisfy:
1
2
(8.11) z/(l+z)4 = 8^ a/a nTn" .
The equation can be solved for z graphically, or simply by trial and
error. Therefore, given the system constants, z can be determined
2
from (8.11) and the optimal experimental design constant, nA , can
be found from (8.9).
9 . Numerical Example
The behavior of the system will next be illustrated by a
numerical example . Given a set of values for the constants, we
design the optimal experiment, determine decision rules for setting
promotion rate, and simulate system operation. Average losses can be
calculated from the simulation or directly from expected loss formulas.
In this section we suppose that the underlying model on which we have
based the system design is correct. We compare optimal operation with
various other policies. In a later section we consider examples of
what happens when the underlying model is not what we supposed.
Constants . In constructing the example we have tried to pick
realistic values for the constants. We have not, however, tried to
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represent any specific product. Sales and other figures will be given
in absolute units, but the example is constructed from assumptions
about percentages. Therefore, to the extent that the results are
realistic, they are intended to be realistic under changes of scale
that multiply sales and promotion by the same factor.
The constants have been chosen to give sales of about 25 million
dollars/year (s = .50 dol./hh.yr., based on 50 million households).
Promotion rate is about 1.5 million dollars/year (x = .03 dol./hh.yr.)
or roughly 67o of sales. Gross profit margin has been taken as 1/3 of
the selling price.
The performance of the system is sensitive to the accuracy of the
experiment^ which in turn depends on the variance of sales among
markets. We have chosen a Is = TL, a value that has been achieved by
some companies in field experiments. We permit an experimental devia-
o
tion in promotion rate of ±25% of the long term average, x , Then
oA = .5x
. Much larger deviations have been used in practice for
single experiments. The proposed deviation seems workable for con-
tinuous use.
The hardest question in picking constants is how to set reason-
able values for the sales response parameters. There are a few sales
experiments that have given an indication of diminishing returns for
the case of advertising. As might be expected, the results show
considerable variation. We have chosen p and ^ so that they lie
within the rather wide range of values that are consistent with these
experiments. The constant o determines the period to period variance
P
in sales response. The choice here has been quite subjective. However
Field experiments are usually analyzed by regressions that take into
account as many relevant variables as possible. The a here refers to
the residual standard deviation.
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it can be given a concrete interpretation as follows: If promotion
o
rate is held at its reference value^ x
,
there will be sales fluctua-
tions (arising solely from fluctuations in the sales response parameter
P) that are normally distributed and have a standard deviation of 3%
o
of s . The constant k has been taken as .9
. If k had been set at
1.0^ sales response in one period would be made up of last period's
response plus a random fluctuation of the type just discussed. A
value of .9 gives something fairly close to this but provides a
o
tendency for sales to move toward the reference value, s , Speci-
fically, in the absence of new fluctuations, the difference between
actual sales and the reference value would be reduced by 10% in each
time period.
To summarize and add detail:
o
a = .32 = sales rate m absence of any promotion, (dol
.
/hh.yr
.)
o
P = 9 = long run average of sales response parameter p.
(dimensionless)
^ = 100 = curvature parameter of sales response function.
(dol. /hh.yr)
'^
m = 1/3 = gross profit as a fraction of selling price.
(dimensionless)
These lead to reference values, calculated from (8.6) and (8.7):
X = .03 = reference promotion rate. (dol. /hh.yr.)
s = .50 = reference sales rate, (dol, /hh.yr.)
x°/s° = 67„ .
The model of sales response f luctuations__has_paraffleters
:
a = .5 = period to period standard deviation of p(t).
(dimensionless)
k = .9 = persistence constant for P(t). (dimensionless)
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The data related to experimental design are:
o
a = .07 s = .035 = standard deviation of sales rate for an
individual market, (dol. /hh.yr.)
^ = .50 X = .015 = range of experimental deviation in pro-
motion rate. (dol. /hh.yr.)
N = 1000 = number of individual markets of "average" size
required to make up national sales.
Experiment ; To design the experiment^ the appropriate constants
are substituted into (8.11)^ which can be solved to give z = 5.70^
2
then by (8.9)^ nA = .00687, Since we have arbitrarily fixed A at
.015^ n becomes 30.5 or^ rounding,
n = 30 markets.
This completes the experimental design. In each time period 30 markets
o o
will be run at a promotion rate . 25x above the national rate, x (t),
and another 30 markets will be run the same amount below.
The resulting experimental standard error of p is calculated
from (4.4) to be .602 . This does not make a particularly accurate
experiment, considering that we would like to operate on the sales
response curve at the point with slope 1/m = 3.0. Under the above
standard error, we could fairly easily get a measured slope of 2.9
while we were actually operating at 3.5 , However, two factors are
present that make the situation less serious than it might appear.
First of all, the current experiment does not represent all the
available information about sales response. Before setting the pro-
motion rate, current information is combined with past information by
the decision rule. Secondly, profit maximizations of the present type
have the property that, as long as the control variables can be kept
fairly close to their optimal values, losses will be small.
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Decision Rule . In order to set up the decision rule, we need
the smoothing constant a. First v' is found from (6.7) to be .451 .
Then (6.6) gives
a = .446
and (1-a) = .554 . This means we shall be giving fairly equal weight
to new and old information. By combining (5.3) and (5.4), we can
write the decision rule for x (t) as
o^ '
X
,
o
^(t) = a x^(t-l) + |_(l-a)/2ir] ['^(t-1) - (1/m)]
or, substituting numbers,
(9.1) x^(t) = .446 x^(t-l) + .00277 [^(t-1) - 3.o] .
We are now set to operate. Given a starting value, x (0), and a
sequence of experimental results, p(t), we can generate the promotion
rate x (t) .
o
Simulation : To see how the system behaves, we have simulated
the underlying market over time and have operated with the above rule.
The steps in the simulation are briefly as follows: The values for k
o
and p are put into (3.2) to give:
(9.2) %(t) = .9 p(t=l) + .9 +€ (t) .
2
Then random numbers, €. (t), having mean zero and variance a = l/^>
p P
are substituted into (9.2) to generate a sequence of values for p(t).
For the a(t) process we take a(t) = a = .32 dol./hh.yr. for all t. A
varying of a(t) might be more realistic but, since a(t) does not enter
into any decisions, we have simply made it a constant.
Given p(t), the experimental results at t are simulated by
p(t) = P(t) + 6g^ (t) .

-22
Here ^ (t) is a random normal number with mean zero and variance
^ex
V = .363 . (We could simulate each of the 2n test markets separately
to generate p(t) , but it is equivalent and much easier to simulate
the final experimental result directly.)
The company uses p(t) to generate x (t) . The final sales outcome
can be calculated from this, P(t), a., and ^ :
S(t) = .32 + p(t) x^(t) - 100 fx^Ct)] ^ dol./hh.yr.
The sales, in turn, can be used to calculate profit. Our principal
criterion for judging the system, however, is the loss relative to the
profit that could be made under perfect information. The best promo-
tion rate under perfect information can be developed as a side calcu-
lation using (8.1).
X (t) = [|(t)-3j/200 dol./hh.yr.
The loss rate relative to this is, from (2.4):
^(t) = 33.3 [xo(t)-x (t)] dol./hh.yr.
The further loss resulting from the experimental deviations has not
been simulated, but its expected value can be calculated from (8.5).
The simulation results are shown in Figure 5. 40 time periods
o o
are shown. (The series was started with x(0) = x and p(0) = p and
run for 10 periods before the present data were taken.) Plotted are
P(t), which is driving the system, x (t'), by which the company
responds, and the resulting s(t) and j^(t). The latter is expressed
o
as a % of X
We see that the response of the adaptive system is quite good.
Notice that responses in x(t) lag changes in p(t) by a time period
since the information gained during one period is not available until
the next. The losses are generally small, although occasional peaks
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occur where p(t) has changed substantially and x(t) has not yet
caught up. The 40 period average loss is 1.557o of x
Expected losses . The expected losses relative to an operation
based on perfect information can be calculated from various formulas.
We shall use the exact loss formulas given in the Appendix instead
of those of Section 8^ which are based on the k=l approximation. The
differences^ however^ are slight.
Expected Loss Rate
(compared to perfect information)
Source (dol
.
/hh.yr.) (dol./hr.) (% of x°)
X (t) not perfect .000376 18,500 1.23
experimental deviations .001875 5,700 .38
Total 24,200 1.617,
The 40 period average loss rate of 1.557o in the simulation is
reasonably close to the calculated 1.23%. These losses are encourag-
ingly small, especially since the standard is perfect knowledge of
the response curve and since our experiment is not terriby precise.
Comparison with other policies ; The results using the optimal
adaptive system may be compared with other types of operations. One
o
possibility is to set x(t) to a constant value, say x
,
for all t,
o
The rate x has the property of being optimal when p(t) takes on its
long run average value. It is not clear, of course, how the company
would figure out x , Consequently the values ,5x
,
x
,
and l,5x
will be tried. Expected losses compared to perfect information can
be computed from (2.4) and (A. 10) For a constant promotion rate
there is no cost of experimental deviations.
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adaptive system: x (t)
constant rate: x
constant rate: ,5x
constant rate: 1.5x
Expected Loss Rate
(compared to perfect information)
(dol./yr.)
Ik, 200
54,700
430,000
430,000
(% of x")
1.61%
3.65
28.65
28.65
Thus the increased loss ranges from TU of x for the lucky guess to
o
277o of x for the substantial deviation.
Suppose that circumstances prevent an experiment of the proposed
optimal size. Instead of 30 markets in each group, suppose we have
to get along with 15. Then the experimental error would increase
from .602 to .726. The value of a would decrease from .561 to .446,
implying more reliance on past information. The system, however, is
still adaptive.
Expected Loss Rate
(compared to perfect information)
optimal experiment (n=30)
smaller experiment (n=15)
(dol./yr.)
24, 200
25,500
(7o of X )
1.617,
1.70
The deterioration in performance is small,
10, Sensitivity Analysis
The optimal adaptive system performed well in the example of
the previous section, but the optimality of the system is based on
various assumptions about the underlying operation of the market.
Many of these assumptions are questionable. How will the system
perform if some of them are incorrect? To investigate this question.
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we use the experiment and decision rule as derived but change the
underlying market model in various ways.
Constant Sales Response , The original model assumed that
sales response fluctuates over time. Suppose that, instead, sales
response is constant and has p(t) = p° • Then the optimal promotion
rate is x(t) = x . If we use the adaptive system of the previous
section some relative loss will be incurred. The loss can be calcu-
lated using the formulas in the appendix by setting cj„ = 0-
Expected Loss Rate
(compared to perfect information)
adaptive system
constant rate: x
constant rate: .5x
constant rate: 1.5x
(dol./yr.)
11,000
375,000
375,000
(% of X )
.74
25.
25.
We see that the average loss rate using the adaptive system is
only . 747o of x . This is quite smallj in fact, it is less than the
1.617o that occurred when sales response fluctuated. (The reason is
that the stable sales response is inherently easier to optimize.) Of
o
course, if the company president is clairvoyant, he will pick x(t) = x
and have no loss at all. On the other hand, if he misses and sets
x(t) = .5x or 1.5x , a substantial loss is incurred.
Changes in Sales Response Have No Persistence . The earlier model
assumed that sales response changed but that the starting point for
the change was the previous sales response. Thus a goal of the adap-
tive system was to follow sales response as it drifted about. Suppose
instead that sales is subject to fluctuation but has no persistence.
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In other words^ p(t) equals p plus an independent random variable
for each t. This situation may be obtained in our model by setting
k = 0. Under these circumstances the optimal policy is x(t) = x ,
adaptive system
constant rate: x
constant rate: .5x
constant rate: l,5x
Expected Loss Rate
(compared to perfect information)
(dol./yr.)
25,800
10,400
386,000
386,000
a of x")
1.72
.70
25.7
25.7
The adaptive system is not as good as the constant rate x but
the difference is small. On the other hand if a constant rate sub-
stantially different from x is picked, large losses are incurred.
Different curvature . Perhaps the most serious assumption in
the model is that
'if , the curvature parameter in sales response, is
a known constant. In practice, Jf will usually be unknown or poorly
known. We suggested earlier that perhaps our ignorance of if was
not too serious. To test this possibility we make some fairly drastic
changes in but set promotion rate by the adaptive system derived
from the old value.
First, if is reduced from 100 to 25, a factor of 4. Sales re-
sponse is now much more linear.
Expected Loss Rate
(compared to perfect information)
adaptive system
o
constant rate; x
constant rate: .5x°
constant rate: 1.5x
(dol./yr.)
75,000
219,000
312,000
312,000
(°/o of X )
5.01
14.6
20.6
20.6
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The losses compared to nerfect information are found to be
higher than they were for ^ = 100 for both the adaptive system and
o
the constant rate, x . The more linear response means that a change
in p can be made the basis for a substantial and profitable change in
promotion rate (if response is known perfectly) . Without perfect in-
formation, both ways of operating fumble more than formerly. However,
the adaptive system does much better than the best constant value.
Next we increase § by a factor of 4 to 400. Sales response is
now much more nonlinear.
adaptive system
constant rate: x
constant rate: .9x
constant rate: 1 . Ix
Expected Loss Rate
(compared to perfect information)
(dol./yr.)
27,100
13,600
73,600
73,600
(%
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Figure 6. Behavior of average x(t) when p(t) jumps.
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operation would be x = ,03, jumping to .06 at t = 1. Figure 6b
shows the expected value for x(t) under the adpative system of the
previous section. (Because of randomness in the experimental re-
sults, actual operation would fluctuate about the expected value.)
We see that average x(t) lags one time period before starting to
respond and then responds fairly quickly.
In summary, we have devised sensitivity tests to see how the
adaptive system performs when the assumptions on which it is based
are violated in various ways. These tests have been applied to the
numerical example of the previous section. The performance of the
adaptive system is found to be good.
11. Discussion
Perhaps it is surprising that such simple operating rules can
cope successfully with a changing environment. Other examples,
however, are not hard to find. The home thermostat controls tempera-
ture under widely varying conditions of heat loss and does it without
solving heat flow equations on a digital computer. In our case there
are several reasons why the adaptive system operates well. In the
first place, the system overcomes some of the inaccuracy of its
measuring device by working from an accumulation of present and past
information. In the second place, sales response is presumed (reason-
ably enough) to vary smoothly with spending. As a result, the
profit maximum is also smooth. This means that small deviations
from best operation cost very little: underspending gives fewer
sales but saves almost an equal amount in out-of-pocket expensej
overspending is almost counterbalanced by increased sales. Substan-
tial losses are produced only by large deviations and these tend to
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be avoided by the adaptive systecDo Thirdly, various empirical studies
suggest that, once some nominal promotion rate is achieved, spending
rate per se is not a big factor is sales. (The rapid diminishing
returns of the log curve used by Benjamin and Maitland L "^ can be
interpreted this way.) This is not to say that increases or de-
creases may not be profitable but rather to say that they are not
likely to cause the jumps in sales that are caused, for example, by
product changes or, sometimes, by changes in promotional treatment.
The use of the adaptive system requires a tolerance of explicit
uncertainty on the part of a company's management. The system will
specify some definite number for promotion rate, but the available
information on response may be sufficiently ambiguous that other,
rather different numbers look almost as good. Such a situation may
be disconcerting. Some people prefer the pseudo-certainty of a plan
that is defended as exactly right (even though something quite differ-
ent was done the previous year under roughly the same circumstances.)
The adaptive system must be regarded as a set of operating rules that
produce a good average return rather than as a device for producing
the perfect number each time. In fact, uncertainty plays an essential
role in the system since inaccuracy is deliberately accepted in the
optimal design.
11.1 Practical Problems . We shall try to anticipate and discuss
some practical questions that might come up using a system like the
one presented here. First of all, there is a class of questions re-
lating to setting up the system; Is the model as it stands sufficiently
There is an extremely interesting question implicit here; If some
aspect of promotional treatment, for example, advertising copy, is ex-
ceptionally good, should a company spend more or less on promotion?
The answer does not seem obvious.
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good or should certain complications be added? Several of the para-
meters of the model will almost certain be unknown; how should they
be picked? The decision rules have been derived under the assump-
tion of steady state operation; should anything different be done
in starting up?
One approach to handling the uncertainties behind these ques-
tions would be to develop a formal Bayesian analysis of them. How-
ever, the approach suggested by the work here is to gather together
whatever relevant information can be found, build a specific model,
and investigate its behavior by simulation and sensitivity analysis.
For starting up, the past promotion rate of the company could be
used as the past promotion rate required by the model. It might be
desirable to design extra accuracy into the first few experiments.
As a practical matter, however, experimental accuracy will probably
increase rather than decrease with time because of increasing exper-
ience.
Over a number of time periods, information can be built up on
the validity of the model and better estimates can be made of the
constants. Particularly Important is information about iT, since Y
expresses the degree of diminishing returns. Notice that our pro-
posed operation collects information about ^ even though we have not
acknowledged this fact in the analysis. The information is the re-
sult of using three spending levels (x - (A/2), x , (x + (4/2) ).
These permit an estimate of ^ in each time period. Individual es-
timates are likely to be quite unreliable, however. This is one
reason we have chosen not to build the measurement of ^ directly
into the analysis.
Another practical problem is that the decision rules may occa-
sionally call for a really substantial change in spending .rate. In
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some cases the proposed rate may fall outside the range included in
the experiment. Substantial changes are often disturbing to an
organization and changes beyond the experimental conditions are on
less solid empirical ground than those within. One way to handle the
situation is by exercise of the managerial override that obviously
exists on the whole system, A better way^ however, and one that
can be pre-planned and pre-studied is to clamp the amount of change
permitted, say, by limiting it to ±157o pr ±20%, This will tend to
slow down system response, but perhaps not excessively so.
Different market areas, it may be argued, will have different
sales responses to promotion, whereas the measurements discussed
here produce an average response. It seems certainly true that
markets will differ, at least to some degree. However, whether the
differences are appreciable will depend on the situation. Where
they are, it would be desirable to take advantage of them. Possibly,
one can develop an adaptive system that applies to individual mar-
kets, but the measurement problems appear to be quite difficult. A
feasible approach would be to use whatever empirical and judgmental
information is available to develop individual market adjustments
to apply to the average curve. In this case each market would have
its own X (t) and experimental deviations would be made relative to
o
this.
A related problem concerns the nature of the test markets.
Assuming, as we generally have, that the basic experimental unit is
a market area, the test markets themselves will usually be medium-
sized markets. The very large and very small tend to be ruled out by
various operating considerations. Yet, we wish to set promotional
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rate throughout the country. This is basically a problem of in-
dividual market adjustments and can be handled as discussed above.
The experimental design discussion of Section 8 omits a cost
that may sometimes be appreciable, namely, the out-of-pocket cost
of running the experiment. If the cost is substantial, it can
easily be included in the analysis for determining the optimal ex-
periment. If there is a cost proportional to the number of test
2
markets, the quantity nA. will no longer be an invariant constant.
Instead, the calculation will show that total cost is least when the
number of markets, n, is as small as possible and the experimental
deviation, 4 , in the promotion rate is as large as possible. We do
not want A, to become so large that sales are substantially reduced
in the low markets. Although this consideration could be included
in the formal analysis, a simpler procedure is to place an arbitrary
upper limit onZ\. Then n can be calculated in a straightforward way.
The effect of promotion may be delayed. Empirical data (see
references 3, 4, 5, and 6) suggest that the principal response is
frequently fairly rapid, say, within one to three months. If sales
are measured by factory shipments, a pipeline delay will also be
encountered. A nominal value might to 1-1/2 months. In the dis-
cussion here we have obviously assumed that delays are small enough
that a measurement of the promotional effort can be made within the
experimental time period, A period of a year seems appropriate for
many situations. A year also eliminates certain problems of season-
ality and fits in with the budgeting process.
Any control system should be examined for stability. Con-
ceivably, an inappropriate choice of constants relative to the un-
derlying process could result in too small a value of the smoothing
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constant, a, and so an inappropriately large dependence on the most
recent data. This could perhaps lead to an oscillation of under-
spending alternating with overspending However, this does not seem
likely for the type of decision rule being used. In any case, sus-
pected sources of oscillation can be investigated in advance by
simulation.
11.2 Competition . Businessmen frequently are concerned about
a possible self-defeating aspect in promotional competition. If the
effect of promotion is primarily on market share and not on total
demand and, if promotional efficiency is comparable from one company
to another in the industry, then promotional increases may appear
profitable in experiments. Yet, when the increases are applied na-
tionally, they may be countered by competing companies in such a way
that nobody's sales change much but everybody's spending is increased.
Models of this sort of process have been built by a number of writers.
.
8
Mills' paper contains an example.
Several remarks can be made. Let us consider the extreme case
where promotion affects only market share and not total industry
sales. If the companies are operating at competitive equilibrium,
i.e., the companies are already individually operating (within their
measurement capabilities) in the neighborhood of their independent
maximum profit points, then the adaptive system will continue this
type of operation in an efficient manner. Whenever a company starts
over- or under-spending, the adaptive system will tend to return the
spending rate to the maximum profit position.
If, on the other hand, all companies are spending less than they
would at competitive equilibrium, i.e., an accurate experiment would
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indicate that increases would be profitable for each company if the
others stayed constant, then spending rates tend to be unstable. A
company not wishing to disturb the situation may choose to hold pro-
motional spending constant or to adopt a figure close to the industry
average spending as a per cent of sales. Either way, there is no
need for an adaptive system to set promotional spending for it is
already set. (There may be some other interesting applications, how-
ever, in the allocation of funds between promotional alternatives.)
Another policy for this situation, but one that is more likely
to be misunderstood by the competition, is to set stiffer return re-
quirements on promotional spending than those implied by the
conventional maximum profit calculation. This could be done by
using a smaller value for the gross margin than actually was the
case.
It is a rare company that knows whether it is in competitive
equilibrium with respect to promotional spending and whether its
spending appreciably affects industry sales. Some information about
these questions can be obtained in experiments of the type we have
been considering, although, as we have discussed, the information is
likely to deterioriate unless kept up to date.
11.3 Extensions . We mention three particularly desirable
extensions of the model. First it would be helpful to have an adap-
tive system to allocate a fixed budget between several promotional
alternatives. Second, it is unrealistic and undesirable to rely
solely on past experiments to estimate sales response. Certain other
pertinent information is usually available; knowledge of product
changes, forecasts of economic conditions, etc. A step could be
introduced into the feedback loop to bring this information into the
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prior distributions used to set promotional rate. Finally^ it would
be worthwhile to study the possibility of monitoring individual mar-
ket response by time series analysis as a basis for individual market
adjustments.
12. Conclusions
The adaptive system discussed here is directed toward a major
continuing problem: the setting of spending rate for promotion. The
concept of the adaptive system seems basically correct: a company
should learn from experience in an organized way. The model studied
is a simple one but it may be useful as it stands and it certainly
is capable of extension. The operating rules that have been developed
are simple^ feasible, and seem intuitively reasonable. In examples
using realtistic numbers, system performance has been good, despite
a relatively inaccurate measurement process. Of particular interest
is the .insenEitivity_ of performance to substantial changes in the
underlying model
.
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Appendix
The mathematical development so far has been directed toward
finding optimal operation, particularly under the k=l approximation.
However, for sensitivity analyses it is helpful to have exact ex-
pressions for the expected loss rate under various kinds of non-
optimal operation. Accordingly we here solve the following problem:
Given (1) the basic environmental models
2
(A.l) s = a + P(t)x - 5x
(A. 2) p(t) = k p(t-l) + (l-k)p° +€p(t)
P
(2) the decision rules
(A. 3) X (t+1) = a X (t) + (1-a) x (t)
o o o
(A. 4) . x^(t) = ^m p(t) - l] /2m
y
(3) the stochastic process describing the experiment
(A. 5) p(t) = p(t) + €(^)
(4) the loss rate formulas
(A. 6a) i(t) = m^[x^(t) - x*(t)] ^
(A. 6b) j^.(t) = m^ [x^(t) - x"{t)J ^, i = l,2
Find the steady state expected loss rate L.
We shall do this for an arbitrary (not optimal) smoothing con-
stant, a, and an arbitrary (not optimal) experiment of accuracy
2/ 2
V (£ ) = v = 2a /nA . The calculation will proceed by solving
*
difference equations to express p(t), x (t), and x (t) as infinite
sums of independent random variables. The desired expected loss can
be calculated from these.

-37
t.
Successive substitutions in (A. 2) give
(A. 7) P(t) = p° + Z k^ G-(t-j), . ^;
so that in steady state
(A. 8) E [p(t)] = p°
(A. 9) V [pet)] = Op^/d-k^) .
Putting (A. 7) into
t-
•k
X (t) = Qn p(t) - l]/2(!rm
gives
(A. 10) x*(t) = x° + ^ Z kJ € „(t--j)
^^jto P
Therefore in steady state
(A. 11) E [_x (t)] = x°
(A. 12) V G<*(t)] = (l/4sS a^/a-\^S
The calculation of x (t) is a little longer. Successive sub-
o
stitution in (A. 3) gives
(A. 13) X (t+1) = (1-a) £ a^ X (t-j) .
° j=0 °
From (A. 5) and (A. 7) we have
P(t) = p° + "e k^e „(t-j) +€^^(t),
j=0 P ^"^
so that, from (A. 4)
$^(t) = x° + (1/2*-)^ k-^ €(t-j) + [£g^(t)3 /2« .
Putting this in (A. 13), we finally obtain

-38
O* ,, s+1 s+1.
s=0 P
(A. 14)
^o^*""^^^
=
x° + (ll-a)/2^(k-a)] E(k^ -a^
^^B^'^"^^
j=0
In steady state, therefore,
(A. 15) E [x^(t+l)J = x°
(A. 16) V Qc (t+l)J = (7(l-a)/4(iS^(H-a3 [ aAl+ak) /(1-ak) (1-k^) +
Some manipulation using (A. 14) and (A. 10) gives the following
result to be used shortly:
(A. 17) E[2{x^(t+1) - x°|[ x*(t+l) - x°]j =
[a ^/4^-^jCk(l"a) /(1-k^) (l-ak)J .
Turi:\ing now to the loss rates, we observe that (A. 6a) can be
written: '
J?(t) = mjT fC^o(t) - x^ - 2Cx^(t) - x3Cx*(t) - x^
+ [x*(t) - x°] j,
so that E []l?(t)J = mis fv Jx^CtT) + V [x*(t)]
- 2E [[x^(t) -x°j[x*(t)
-^°]]j.
Using now (A. 16), (A. 12) and (A. 17), we have
(A. 18) E Q(t)J = Qa/4r]Q(l-a)a^^^/(H-a) +
2ap^/(l+k)(l+a)(l-ak2]
2
a
ex
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In the case of the experimental markets the analysis of Section
8 holds so that
(A. 19) Epi^t)] = E [Jl^(t}\ = Eg(t)] + mifL^/U .
Weighting (A. 18) and (A. 19) by the n\imber of markets and ex-
o
pressed loss rate as a fraction of x
^
we obtain. the desired quan-
tity
(A. 20) L = [m/4irx°J [Ql-a) /(1+a^ C 2a^/nZl^J
+ 2ag /(l+k)(l+a)(l-ak)? + mXaA^/2Nx®
Finally it is of some interest to find E[s(t)J :
(A. 21) E [s(tj] = s° + [(l-a)/(H-a)4J]Qag'^(ak+2k-l)/l-ak)(l-kS
-0 'l
ex J
Notice that only under special circumstances will E\_s(t)J = s
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